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Abstract
This paper examines the endogenous choice between democracy and con-
flict in a scenario with different social classes in terms of income inequality
and with parties representing each of the two social classes. We consider how
the change in economic inequality between the poor and rich people affects
the sustainability of democracy against conflict and how it impacts the equi-
librium levels of tax rate and public expenditure under democracy. We show
that the increase in economic inequality destabilizes of democracy since the
poor hardly has the incentive to sustain the democracy; Further the increase is
positively associated with the equilibrium levels of both the tax rate and pub-
lic expenditure. Therefore, we successfully provide theoretic justification for
the fact that sufficiently large economic inequality decreases the possibility
of a self-enforcing democracy.
JEL Classification Numbers: H11; D72; D74
Keywords: self-enforcing democracy; civil conflict; economic inequality
1 Introduction
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the endogenous choice between democ-
racy and civil conflict by considering political parties as the representatives of dif-
ferent social groups, which are classified by income inequality. Several empiri-
cal studies, for example, Bulte and Damania (2008) and Ross (2004) show that
resource-abundant countries are less democratic than resource-scarce countries.
Many papers challenge the phenomenon of so-called political “resource-curse.”
In particular, until recently works using game-theoretic modeling could be divided
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into two main groups. One group adopts the model in which resource rents affect
the intensity and duration of civil conflict. Mehlum and Moene (2002) and Skaper-
das (2002) showed that social welfare reduces as natural resources are wasted on
unproductive arming and fighting. Torvik (2002) developed a simple mechanism
to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare using
the rent-seeking game-theoretic model. The other group, which has emerged rela-
tively recently, suggests the model where voters are explicitly considered and stud-
ies the impact of resource abundance on the political equilibrium. Robinson and
Torvik (2005) explicitly modeled politicians to explain the mis-allocation of in-
vestment. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) constructed a simple model in which
political elites may block technological and institutional development. Moreover,
Robinson et al. (2006) studied the political incentives generated by resource rents
and resource booms. The first group comprises of the works that try to explain the
relation between civil conflicts and resource rents, whereas the second group inves-
tigates the cause of the resource-curse in a more political context. Recent literature
on resource-curse provides an integrated analysis in the above two groups. The pio-
neering work of Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) analyzed the model in which the form
of political competition–more precisely, electoral competition or civil conflict–is
endogenous under the super-game theoretic framework. In this model, they ob-
tained the result that in the (self-enforcing) equilibrium, the likelihood of democ-
racy is inversely proportional to the size of the resource rents relative to national
income.
The purpose of our work is to explore the endogenous choice between democ-
racy and civil conflict taking into consideration the existence of different social
classes in society. We add the following two considerable points to the model
presented by Aslaksen and Torvik (2006): First; the constituent members in the
society are different with respect to economic level; they are classified into three
classes, the poor, middle, and wealthy. Second, both the political parties are re-
garded as representatives of the poor and wealthy, respectively. When we take into
account of the difference between each individual’s economic standard, the attitude
toward the optimal size of the government under democracy should differ across
classes. Furthermore, it is obvious that under civil conflict, the opportunity cost
of the effort to civil conflict is higher for the wealthy than for the poor. Thus, we
can state that political preferences differ with respect to the economic level, Later,
we examine how the change in economic inequality between the poor and wealthy
affects the sustainability of democracy in the context of civil conflict and how it
influences the equilibrium levels of tax rate and public expenditure under a self-
enforcing democracy. In this paper, we obtain the following three results. First,
the increase in economic inequality results in the instability of the democratic state
since the party, as the representative of the poor, hardly has the incentive to sus-
tain the democracy. Second, in a society where economic inequality is relatively
large, the equilibrium tax rate might increase since the party as the representative
of the wealthy may choose a political platform favorable to the poor. This result is
closely related to that of Przeworski (2005) who also showed that the equilibrium
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platform becomes hopeful for the poor in the context of resource-curse. Akin to
Przeworski, we as well as he present the asymmetric equilibrium different from the
standard median voting equilibrium. In addition to the above two results, we get
our third result, which is similar to the second result, that the party as the represen-
tative of the wealthy chooses a platform that is relatively favorable to the poor with
the increase in natural resources, resulting in an increase in the public expenditure
becomes larger. At the end of our analysis, we confirm that all the results in this
paper hold against an extension to an infinitely repeated game model. Our results
theoretically support the observations in the real world economy and the conclu-
sion of several empirical works. We believe that our formulation and findings have
sufficient importance to investigate the resource-curse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct
the basic setting. In Section 3, we examine the endogenous choice between democ-
racy and civil conflict and derive the conditions for the different political outcomes.
Furthermore, we extend the model to the one which is formulated under an indef-
initely repeated-game framework. Section 4 concludes with some remarks. The
proofs of all the propositions are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We formulate the model based on the works of Przeworski (2005) and Aslaksen
and Torvik (2006). Assume that a society consists of three types of income earners:
the poor, middle, and wealthy. These are indexed by i 2 fp;m;wg. Further, their
proportions in the society are such that pii 2 (0;0:5) for all i. These types may
be interpreted on the basis of their ethnic, regional, or religious affiliations. A
multiple of the average income is αi for all i 2 fp;m;wg; thus, αp < αm < αw. The
average income is normalized to 1. Two political parties vie for political power in
the society; the left party represents group p and the right party represents group
w. We also index the parties by the groups that they represent. The objectives of
the parties are to maximize the expected value of vi ´ ui ¡ βi for all i, where (i)
βi is the gross cost of conflict when a conflict occurs at t and (ii) ui is the benefit
for each person of group i evaluated by party i. We assume that ui is determined
by the amount of private consumption ci, government spending for public goods g,
and rent of the group ri. The benefit for each person in group i 2 fw;m; pg, ui, is
given by ui = h(g)+ci +γiri, where h denotes the benefit from public goods and γi
is the multiplier of the rents relative to private consumption. We specify function h
as follows:
h(g)´ k log
µ
g+δ
δ
¶
: (1)
Thus, function h satisfies the following normal conditions: h(0) = 0, h0 > 0
and h00 < 0. We assume that (i) h0(0) > 1 and (ii) γi > h0(0) for each i 2 fp;wg.
Assumption (i) implies k > δ , i.e. the public goods is at minimum efficient rela-
tive to private consumption for the society while assumption (ii) implies that the
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rents are more attractive than public goods. Moreover, we assume that the income
inequality between groups p and w is sufficiently large with respect to the ratio of
the multipliers of the rents: αw=αp > (γw=γp)2. The timing of events in the game
is given as follows:
1. Each of the two parties announce a political platform (a tax rate).
2. An election is held. Each party decides whether to accept the electoral result
of to initiate conflict.
3. If (at least) one of the parties chooses to initiate a conflict, a conflict is initi-
ated. The winner of the conflict then decides the new policy and executes it.
If no party initiates a conflict, the political platform announced by the winner
of the election is implemented.
The tax rate on income in each political platform is given by τ 2 [0; τ¯], where
τ¯ is the socially limited maximum tax rate. When a conflict is not initiated and the
elected party i proposed τi as its platform, the party i must execute the tax rate and
use all its finance for public goods: g = τi+R, where R is the amount of natural (or
non-tax) resources relative to the gross income of the society. At this point, for the
members of each group i = fp;m;wg, private consumption is (1¡ τ)αi and rents
are zero. Thus, when the implemented tax rate is τ , we describe the benefit for
group i, udi (τ) as follows:
udi (τ) = h(τ +R)+(1¡ τ)αi = k log
µ
τ +R+δ
δ
¶
+(1¡ τ)αi: (2)
We assume that the voters are sincere. Thus, when the platforms of both the
parties are represented by τp and τw, respectively, a voter in group i 2 fp;m;wg
supports party p only if udi (τp) ¸ udi (τw). Since pii < 0:5 for all i, party p wins
in the election with probability 1 if udm(τp) > udm(τw), probability ρp 2 (0;1) if
udm(τp) = u
d
m(τw), and probability 0 if udm(τp) < udm(τw). The probability at which
party w wins is given in the same way.
Let τ i be the optimal tax rate for group i under democracy: τ i ´ argmaxui(τ).
We assume that the optimal tax rates of group p and m have an interior solution;
this implies that
τ i =
k
αi
¡δ ¡R > 0 8i 2 fp;mg (3)
and τ¯ > τ p. Thus, the assumption regarding efficiency of public goods ensures that
τ p > τm > τw.
In the case of conflict, the probability Pp at which party p wins the conflict
depends on the fighting efforts of the two parties, ep and ew. The military contest
success function follows the standard specification of Tullock (1975). That is, we
specify Pp as follows:
Pp(ep;ew)´ ep
ep + ew
: (4)
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The probability at which party w wins, Pw, is given as Pw = 1¡Pp. For each
party i2 fp;wg, the marginal cost per unit of fighting efforts is equal to the income
of the group, αi. Thus, the gross cost βi of conflict for party i with effort ei is
denoted by αiei.
When party i is the winner of the conflict, party i provides and executes a new
policy. Since γi > g0(0), party i chooses the maximum tax rate (τ = τ¯) and spends
all finance on the rents of group i after the conflict. Thus, g = 0 and the private
consumption of group i is (1¡ τ¯)αi. The rents of group i are R+ τ¯ . For each group
j 6= i, the consumption is (1¡ τ¯)α j and the rents are 0. Now, we describe ucii as the
benefit of group i when party i is the winner of the conflict:
ucii = γi (τ¯ +R)+αi(1¡ τ¯): (5)
Similarly, the benefit of group j when party i wins the conflict, uci j, is denoted as
follows:
uci j = α j(1¡ τ¯): (6)
3 Analysis
First, we consider the strategy of each party when a conflict is initiated. Since the
winning party chooses a policy that maximizes its benefit, before the conflict is
initiated, for each i 2 fp;wg, the expected benefit for group i with effort ep and ew
in the period is given by
ei
ei + e j
ucii +
e j
ei + e j
ucji¡αiei; (7)
where j 2 fp;wg and j 6= i. Since each group i2 fp;wg simultaneously decides its
fighting effort e¤i to maximize the expected benefit given by the opponent group’s
effort, the effort in the equilibrium is given by
e¤i =
α j
γ j
(αiγi +
α j
γ j )
2
1
(τ¯ +R)
; (8)
where i; j 2 fp;wg and j 6= i. By substituting this result into equation (7), the
expected benefit u¯ci for each group i 2 fp;wg per a period in a conflict is given by
u¯ci = ¯P
2
i (τ¯ +R)+αi(1¡ τ¯); (9)
where ¯Pi ´ α jγ j =
³
αi
γi +
α j
γ j
´
. If the expected benefit of continuing democracy is less
than u¯ci , then party i chooses to initiate a conflict.
Now, we consider the situation wherein a conflict is not initiated. When a
conflict is not initiated, each group announces a tax rate as its policy platform.
After the election, the tax rate directed by the winner is implemented.
The following fact is satisfied.
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Fact 1: For each τ 2 [0; τ¯], (udr (τ)¡ u¯cr)> (udp(τ)¡ u¯cp).
Proof. From easy calculations,
(udr (τ)¡ u¯cr)¡ (udp(τ)¡ u¯cp) = (αw¡αp) [(τ¯ ¡ τ)+R]+ (R+ τ¯)
¡
γp ¯P2p ¡ γw ¯P2w
¢
(10)
is positive since we assume that αwγ2w >
αp
γ2p
.
Now, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The property of the self-enforcing democracy and the equilibrium
policy in democracy is as follows:
1. If u¯cp > udp(τ p), then democracy is not self-enforcing.
2. If udp(τ p) ¸ u¯cp ¸ udp(τm), then there exists a (unique) tax rate τ¤ 2 [τm;τ p]
such that udp(τ¤)¡ u¯cp = 0 and udp(τ)¡ u¯cp < 0 for each τ < τ¤, and each group
announces tax rate τ¤ as its platform. Thus, the tax rate τ¤ is implemented
for each period.
3. If udp(τm)> u¯cp, then each group announces tax rate τm as its platform. Thus,
tax rate τm is implemented for each period.
The proof is provided in the Appendix. udp(τ p) < u¯cp implies that party p has
no incentive to support the election even if the result of the election is the most
preferable policy for its group. Thus, democracy is not self-enforcing. On the
other hand, udp(τm) > u¯cp implies that party p prefers to accept the most hopeful
policy for the median voter (in group m) than to initiate conflict. Thus, the result
of the election competition follows in accordance with the median voter theorem.
The reason that τ¤ becomes an equilibrium tax rate when udp(τ p)¸ u¯cp > udp(τm)
is as follows. By Fact 1 and the definition of τ¤, group w strictly prefers tax rate
τ¤ over conflict. However, for group p, democracy and conflict are indifferent at
tax rate τ¤. Thus, party p has no incentive to support the result of the election if
party w proposes a tax rate less than τ¤. Therefore, the threat of initiating conflict
by party p is credible and party w makes a concession to party p in the election.
The second point in Proposition 1 is interesting in the manner that the equi-
librium policy is sensitive to the incentive of group p for sustaining democracy in
that case; in the median voter rule, when the preferences of voters is different from
that of the median voter, the result of the election are not influenced. This has a
significant impact on the following propositions.
Next, we consider the effect of natural resources on democracy and equilib-
rium policy. By Proposition 1, self-enforcing democracy is possible if and only if
6
udp(τ
p)¸ u¯cp; alternatively,
udp(τ
p)¡ u¯cp =
µ
k log( k
αpδ
)+αp¡ k+αpδ +αpR
¶
¡ ¡γp ¯P2p (τ¯ +R)+αp(1¡ τ¯)¢
=
µ
k log( k
αpδ
)+(¡k+αpδ )+(αp¡ γ ¯P2p)τ¯
¶
+
¡
αp¡ γ ¯P2p
¢
R;
(11)
is nonnegative. Note that this is a linear expression of R. There exist two cases
with respect to the coefficient of R, αp¡ γ ¯P2p : negative or nonnegative.
Proposition 2. The relation between natural resources and democracy is as fol-
lows:
1. If αp ¡ γ ¯P2p ¸ 0, then democracy is possible regardless of the amount of
natural resource.
2. If αp¡ γ ¯P2p < 0, then democracy is possible when
R ·
k log( kαpδ )+(¡k+αpδ )+(αp¡ γ ¯P2p)τ¯
γ ¯P2p ¡αp
: (12)
Proposition 2 implies a kind of resource curse; the increase of natural resources
relative to the average income has a positive effect on civil conflict.
Next, we consider the equilibrium policy when the increase in natural resources
reduces the likelihood of a democracy.
Proposition 3. When αp ¡ γ ¯P2p < 0, government expenditure increases with the
increase in natural resources.
The increase in natural resources in itself has no effect on the optimal supply
of public goods for each group. However, since the increase of natural resources
weakens the incentive of group p to support democracy, group w is required to
make additional concessions to group p. Thus, there is an increase in government
spending.
Finally, we consider the relation between the economic inequality of two groups,
democracy, and the equilibrium policy. For any τ 2 [0; τ¯ ], differentiating up(τ)¡ u¯p
with respect to αp and αw, we obtain the following:
∂
∂αw
³
udp(τ)¡ u¯cp
´
=¡γ(τ¯ +R) ∂
¯P2p
∂αw
< 0; (13)
∂
∂αp
³
udp(τ)¡ u¯cp
´
= (τ¯ ¡ τ)αp¡ γ(τ¯ +R)
∂ ¯P2p
∂αp
> 0: (14)
Note that ∂ ¯Pp∂αp < 0,
∂ ¯Pp
∂αw > 0.
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Proposition 4. An increase in the economic inequality between groups p and w
makes democracy less likely.
An increase in the income of group w depresses its ability to fight in conflict
since it raises the cost of hiring soldiers. It makes group p favorable for conflict.
Thus, it decreases the incentive for group p to support democracy instead of con-
flict. The increase of group p’s income also depresses its ability to fight. The effect
of an increase in disposal income under democracy must exceed that of an increase
in the remaining income after group p loses the conflict. Thus, group p has more
incentive to support democracy. Therefore, an increase in the economic inequality
reduces hte likelihood of a democracy.
Finally, we obtain the result that an increase in the economic inequality re-
sults in increased concessions from party w in the election since a large inequality
decreases the incentive for group p to support democracy.
Proposition 5. An increase in the economic inequality between groups p and w
raises the equilibrium tax rate.
Przeworski (2005) and Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) analyzed the endogenous
choice between democracy and civil conflict by infinite-period models. In their
model, the parties choose whether or not to initiate a conflict before the election.
The self-enforcing democracy is achieved by a trigger-strategy equilibrium; when
the conflict is initiated at a period, the party chooses to pursue the conflict after the
period.
Our propositions can be also considered as the results of an infinite period
model if we define self-enforcing democracy as the dynamic equilibrium satisfying
the following condition:
² whenever democracy prevails, each party does not initiate conflict, announces
a (period-independent) policy platform maximizing its expected utility of the
period, and accept the election result, and further,
² when it is initiated, the parties choose to pursue the conflict. The chosen
fighting efforts maximize the expected utilities of the period.
This is similar to the definitions of self-enforcing democracy in Przeworski
(2005) and Aslaksen and Torvik (2006).
The condition for the parties to choose initiating a conflict after an election in
an infinite period model is equivalent with the condition of the single period model
since, in our model, the equilibrium tax rate is unique independently of the result
of an election and both the benefits to continue democracy and initiate a conflict
are equivalent between before and after an election.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the endogenous choice between democracy and civil
conflict in line of with the literature on the resource-curse. In particular, we ex-
tended the model of Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) to include the scenario wherein
there exists three social classes and two parties supported by the two classes of the
three. We obtained the result that an increase in economic inequality between poor
and rich people tends to weaken democracy in equilibrium. Thus, from this result,
not only in the existing literature in this field but also in our new model assuming
the existence of different social classes and the two parties as the representative of
the two classes, the phenomenon of the resource-curse can be explained. Moreover,
we found that economic inequality is positively associated with both the tax rate
levels and public expenditure. We theoretically succeed to show that sufficiently
large economic inequality incurs decreasing of the possibility to self-enforce the
democracy.
There are two interesting extensions of our model. We assumed that the middle
class does not have a political party that represents their own political idea and
philosophy. The next obvious step is to consider the issue of the instability of
democracy on the condition that there exist a political party as the representative of
the middle class. Furthermore, we restricted our scope to the analysis of a simple
single-period model, and thus in our model, the relation between the quantity of
natural resources and durability of civil conflict cannot explicitly be considered in
our model. These issues are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. ??
The case of u¯cp > udp(τ p): The proposition obviously follows.
The case of udp(τ p)¸ u¯cp ¸ udp(τm): Since u00p(τ)< 0 follows from h00 < 0, there
must be a (unique) tax rate τ¤ 2 [τm;τ p] such that up(τ¤)¡ u¯p = 0 and up(τ)¡ u¯p <
0 for each τ < τ¤. Based on Fact 1, udw(τ)¸ u¯cw for each τ 2 [τw;τ¤].
Claim 1: If an equilibrium of democracy exists, τ¤ must be implemented.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium of democracy. Let τi be the equilibrium
platform for party i 2 fp;wg.
Step 1: There exists no party i 2 fp;wg such that group m strictly prefers τi to
τ¤.
If not, the result of the election must not be acceptable for party p.
Step 2: Both parties cannot win the election at the same time in spite of τp 6=
τw.
Otherwise, since party p does not initiate conflict before the election, it follows
that
ρpudp(τp)+(1¡ρp)udp(τw)¸ u¯cp: (15)
By this equation, it follows that τi > τ¤ > τ j with i; j 2 fp;wg and party p can
make a profit by announcing a platform strictly lower than τi but sufficiently close
to minfτi;τ pg.
Step 3: There exists party i with τi = τ¤
If not, party w can make a profit by announcing a platform strictly higher than
τ¤ and sufficiently close to τ¤.
By Step 1, 2, and 3, there exists a party that announces τ¤ and no party an-
nounces a platform that is strictly preferred by group m.
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Next, we show that there exists an equilibrium. In fact, if each party announces
τ¤, it becomes an equilibrium. In this case, party p clearly chooses a best response
strategy. Party w also cannot make a profit; if it announces a platform that is
strictly preferred by group m to τ¤, party p must initiate a conflict after the election;
otherwise, party w must lose the election. Thus, the proposition follows.
The case of udp(τm) > u¯cp: By Fact 1, udw(τ) > u¯cw for each τ 2 [τw;τ p]. Thus, It
is clearly an equilibrium that each party announces τm as its platform.
We show that the equilibrium is unique. Assume not; thus, there exists another
equilibrium. Let τi be the equilibrium platform for party i 2 fp;wg. Now, both
parties cannot win the election at the same time in spite of τp 6= τw; otherwise, τp
and τw are indifferent for group m and τi > τm > τ j with i; j 2 fp;wg, and party p
can make a profit by announcing a platform lower than τi but sufficiently close to
minfτi;τ pg.
Thus, if the chosen tax rate is higher than τm, party w can make a profit by
announcing a platform lower than the tax rate but sufficiently close to the tax rate.
If the chosen tax rate is lower than τm, party p can make a profit by announc-
ing a platform higher than the tax rate but sufficiently close to the tax rate. This
contradicts the assumption.
Proof of Proposition 2. ?
The case of αp¡ γ ¯P2p ¸ 0: Since 1 > αp and g’s efficiency ensure that k > δ , it
follows that k log( kαpδ )+(¡k+αpδ )> 0. Thus, αp¡γ ¯P2p ¸ 0 implies that equation
(11) is positive. By Proposition 1, the proposition follows.
The case of αp ¡ γ ¯P2p < 0: The proposition follows from equation (11) and
proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. ?
Since the increase in natural resources makes democracy less likely, αp ¡
γ ¯P2p < 0. There exist three types of relation between udp(τ p);udp(τm); and u¯cp.
The case of u¯cp ¸ udp(τ p): Proposition 1 and 2 implies that no democracy is self-
enforcing when the natural resources R increase.
The case of udp(τm) ¸ u¯cp > udp(τ p): Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium
tax rate τ¤ is in [τm;τ p). By differentiating up(τ¤(R))¡ u¯p = 0 with respect to R,
we obtain:
dτ¤
dR =¡
hg¡ γp ¯P2p
(hg¡αp) ; (16)
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where hg ´ ∂∂g h(τ¤+R). (Note hg < ∂∂g h(τ p +R) = αp.) Thus,
d
dR(τ
¤+R) =
γ ¯P2p ¡αp
hg¡αp > 0; (17)
and proposition follows.
The case of udp(τm)> u¯cp: Proposition 1 and Equation (3) imply that government
expenditure is τm +R = kαm ¡δ and constant to R.
Proof of proposition 4. ?
The condition for a self-enforcing democracy is that udp(τ p)¡ u¯cp ¸ 0. Since τ p
maximizes udp(τ p)¡ u¯cp, Equations (13), (14), and the envelope theorem imply that
d
dαw
³
udp(τ
p)¡ u¯cp
´
< 0; (18)
d
dαp
³
udp(τ
p)¡ u¯cp
´
> 0; (19)
and the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. ?
There exist three types of relation between udp(τ p);udp(τm); and u¯cp.
The case of u¯cp ¸ udp(τ p): Proposition 1 and 4 implies that no democracy is self-
enforcing when αw increases or αp decreases.
The case of udp(τ p)> u¯cp ¸ udp(τm): Since the equilibrium tax rate τ¤ is in [τm;τ p),
we have ddτ u
d
p(τ
¤) > 0. By differentiating up(τ¤)¡ u¯cp with respect to αp and αw,
we obtain
dτ¤
dαw
=¡ ∂∂αw
³
udp(τ
¤)¡ u¯cp
´
=
∂
∂τ
³
udp(τ
¤)¡ u¯cp
´
> 0; (20)
dτ¤
dαp
=¡ ∂∂αp
³
udp(τ
¤)¡ u¯cp
´
=
∂
∂τ
³
udp(τ
¤)¡ u¯cp
´
< 0; (21)
and the proposition follows.
The case of udp(τm) > u¯cp: Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium tax rate is
τm = kαm ¡δ ¡R and constant to αp and αw.
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